We study optimal ¢nancial contracting for centralized and decentralized ¢rms. Under centralized contracting, headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects. Under decentralized contracting, each project raises funds separately on the external capital market. The bene¢t of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash-£ow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-£ow projects. The cost is that headquarters may pool cash £ows from several projects and self-¢nance follow-up investments without having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, it is more di⁄cult to force headquarters to make repayments, which tightens ¢nan-cing constraints ex ante. Cross-sectionally, our model implies that conglomerates should have a lower average productivity than stand-alone ¢rms.
BEGINNING WITH FAZZARI, HUBBARD, AND PETERSEN (1988) , several studies document that the investment behavior of ¢rms is a¡ected by ¢nancing constraints. 1 In this paper, we explore the relation between ¢nancing constraints and organizational structure. Speci¢cally, we ask whether centralized ¢rms where headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects face tighter or looser ¢nancing constraints than stand-alone ¢rms.
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redeploying assets across divisions (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) ), or weakening managerial incentives (Stein (2002) ). Naturally, these activities will a¡ect the return to capital and hence also the ¢rm's ¢nancing constraint. As none of these papers adopts an optimal contracting approach, the precise nature and magnitude of the e¡ect remains unclear, however. On the other hand, optimal contracting models, while deriving ¢nancing constraints and the associated underinvestment problem from ¢rst principles, typically consider an entrepreneurial ¢rm where the entrepreneur raises funds for a single project. In this setting, questions of organizational structure and multiple projects cannot be addressed. This paper adopts an optimal contracting approach to examine the role of headquarters for ¢nancing constraints, thus tying together internal and external capital markets. We compare optimal contracting between (a) outside investors and individual project managers (''decentralized borrowing''), and (b) outside investors and headquarters, who borrows on behalf of multiple projects and subsequently allocates the funds to the various projects on the ¢rm's internal capital market (''centralized borrowing'').The term ''borrowing'' refers to the fact that in our setting, like in related multiperiod settings by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , Hart and Moore (1998) , and DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) , the optimal contract is a debt contract. Financing constraints arise endogenously in our model as we assume that part of the project cash £ow is nonveri¢able. The problem is then to provide the ¢rm (i.e., the project manager or headquarters) with incentives to pay out funds rather than to divert them.
The bene¢t of centralization is that ¢nancial contracts with centralized ¢rms are more e⁄cient. To make the ¢rm reveal its true cash £ow, investors must o¡er it a bribe. In a two-period model like ours, bribes can come in two forms. Either the ¢rm makes a lower repayment in the ¢rst period, or it is o¡ered a higher continuation bene¢t. The continuation bene¢t is the expected rent captured by the ¢rm in the second period if the ¢nancing relationship is continued. Under centralized borrowing, a greater fraction of the bribe comes in the form of continuation bene¢ts, which is e⁄cient as it involves undertaking positive NPV second-period investments that would have not been undertaken otherwise. E¡ectively, headquarters uses excess liquidity from high-cash-£ow projects to buy continuation rights for low-cash-£ow projects.This allows headquarters to make greater repayments, which eases ¢nancing constraints ex ante.
The cost of centralization is that headquarters can accumulate internal funds by pooling cash £ows from di¡erent projects and self-¢nance second-period investments without returning to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, however, it is more di⁄cult for investors to force the ¢rm to pay out funds, which tightens ¢nancing constraints.This last point is reminiscent of Jensen (1986) , where the problem is also that ¢rms can undertake investments without revisiting the capital market. Our model adopts an ex ante perspective: Anticipating that a free cash-£ow problem might arise, investors are reluctant to provide ¢nancing in the ¢rst place.
Based on these costs and bene¢ts of centralization, we trace out the boundaries of the ¢rm. Ceteris paribus, centralization is optimal for projects with a
I. Centralized versus Decentralized Borrowing

A. The Model
The model is a multiperiod contracting model with partially nonveri¢able cash £ows in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) , Gertner et al. (1994) , and Hart and Moore (1998) . For the same reason as in these models, the optimal contract in our model is a debt contract. Anticipating this result, we use the term ''borrowing'' to denote the act of raising external ¢nance. While the basic formulation here follows Bolton and Scharfstein, none of the results in this paper depend on the speci¢cs of their model. In Section II.C, we show that the same trade-o¡ also obtains in a Hart^Moore type framework.
Suppose a project lasts for two periods. In each period, it requires an investment outlay I40 and yields an end-of-period cash £ow p l oI with probability p40 and p h 4I with probability 1 À p, where p h 4p l . Cash £ows are uncorrelated across periods. Instead of assuming that a project lasts for two periods, we could equally imagine two separate, but technologically identical (sub)projects that are carried out one after the other. The expected per-period cash £ow net of investment costs is strictly positive, that is, p :¼ pp l þ 1 À p ð Þp h 4I: Suppose a ¢rm has two such two-period projects. For the moment, we shall assume that cash £ows are uncorrelated across projects. In Section III.A, we relax this assumption. As the ¢rm has no funds, it must raise funds from outside investors. For convenience, we assume there is a single investor who makes a take-itor-leave-it o¡er to the ¢rm. While the assumption that there is a single investor may seem unrealistic, it is inconsequential for our results. The only reason for making this assumption is that it simpli¢es the contracting problem. See Section II.E and footnote 3 for a discussion of this issue.
The ¢rm's founder can choose between two organizational structures, which di¡er in their assignment of projects to managers. Under centralized borrowing, a single manager called headquarters is in charge of both projects. Under decentralized borrowing, a separate project manager is in charge of each project. We use the standard assumption that agents in charge of projects maximize the cash proceeds from projects under their control, for instance, because they derive private bene¢ts that are proportional to these proceeds. As projects require no monitoring or managerial e¡ort, but only capital, the question is therefore whether the founder should form one ¢rm where headquarters borrows on behalf of both projects or two separate ¢rms that borrow independently on the external capital market. While the problem is framed as an organizational design problem, it could be equally framed as a divestiture problem where a conglomerate contemplates spinning o¡ one of its divisions. The model and results would be the same.
Neither cash £ows nor investment decisions are veri¢able, which implies contracts can only condition on payments to and from the investor as well as public messages. The assumption that cash £ows are nonveri¢able is standard and captures the notion that outsiders such as courts frequently have less information than the parties to a contract. Since we adopt a message-game approach, it actually makes no di¡erence whether cash £ows and investment decisions are observable but nonveri¢able, or whether they can be observed by project managers and headquarters but not by investors. We can therefore equally assume that project managers and headquarters have private information about cash £ows and investment decisions. The assumption that investment decisions are nonveri¢able simpli¢es the analysis, but is not needed. In Section II.C we show that the same kind of trade-o¡ obtains in a setting where investment decisions are veri¢able. Finally, even though courts cannot observe actual cash £ows, it is commonly known that the lowest possible cash £ow is p l . Hence, we can equally assume that a fraction p l of the cash £ow is veri¢able and only the di¡erence p h À p l is nonveri¢able.
Under both centralized and decentralized borrowing, the partial nonveri¢abil-ity of cash £ows creates an incentive problem between the ¢rm and the investor. Under centralized borrowing, the problem is to provide headquarters with incentives to pay out funds. Under decentralized borrowing, the problem is to provide individual project managers with incentives to pay out funds. Under centralized borrowing, there are two subcases, depending on whether a high-cash-£ow ¢rm can partly self-¢nance second-period investment or not.We shall label these subcases ''self-¢nancing''and ''no self-¢nancing, '' respectively.
B. Decentralized Borrowing
The model of decentralized borrowing is adapted from Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) . Under decentralized borrowing, each of the two project managers borrows separately on the external capital market. As the contracting problem is the same for each manager, we will henceforth speak of the manager and the project. The standard way to deal with nonveri¢ability of cash £ows is to adopt a messagegame approach. In the present context, this means that after the cash £ow is realized, the manager makes a publicly veri¢able announcement stating that the cash £ow is either low or high. The sequence of events is as follows:
Date 0: The investor pays I and the manager (optimally) invests. Date 1: The manager announces that the ¢rst-period cash £ow isŝ s 2 l; h f g: Based on this announcement, the manager makes a ¢rst repayment R 1ŝ s ð Þ; and the investor ¢nances second-period investment, that is, he pays I a second time, with probability bŝ s ð Þ: If the manager receives I, he again (optimally) invests. Date 2: Based on the date 1 announcement, the manager makes a second repayment R 2ŝ s ð Þ:
Two comments are in order. Like most ¢nancial contracting models, we allow for probabilistic (re)¢nancing schemes to permit nontrivial solutions. If the continuation probability can be either zero or one, the qualitative results are the same but the bene¢ts from centralization are smaller. Second, while it is theoretically possible to have the manager also announce the second-period cash £ow (in case he receives funding at date 1), this is pointless as he will always claim that the second-period cash £ow is low. By contrast, it is possible to induce the manager to truthfully reveal the ¢rst-period cash £ow by threatening him not to provide second-period ¢nancing. An implicit assumption herein is that, if the manager of a high-cash-£ow ¢rm claims that the cash £ow is low, he cannot use the remaining cash to self-¢nance second-period investment. If he could, the investor's threat to terminate funding would be empty and ¢nancing would break down completely. Formally, the assumption is
Recall that the investor can always extract p l . An immediate implication of Assumption 1 is that p l 40, or else the assumption that p h 4I is violated. 
where r(l): 5 p l and r(h): 5 p h . The ¢rst constraint is the manager's incentive compatibility (or truth-telling) constraint. The remaining two constraints are limited liability constraints. The ¢rst states that the ¢rst-period repayment must not exceed the ¢rst-period cash £ow, while the second states that the total repayment must not exceed the sum of ¢rst-and second-period cash £ows. Whenever (1) and (2) are satis¢ed, the manager's individual rationality constraint is also satis¢ed, which is why it can be omitted.
From Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , we know that the solution to this problem
If the manager announces that the ¢rst-period cash £ow is high, he receives second-period ¢nancing for sure. If he announces that the cash £ow is low, he receives no second-period ¢nancing.
The optimal contract involves two types of ine⁄ciencies. First, with probability p, the second-period investment is not undertaken. Despite this ine⁄ciency, however, there will be no renegotiation on the equilibrium path as the maximum which the investor can assure in the second period is p l oI. Second, if we insert the optimal contract in the investor's objective function and solve for the value of I at which he breaks even, we have that the investor invests at date 0 if and only if
Projects that cost less than p but more than the right-hand side in (3) receive no funding at date 0 even though they have a strictly positive NPV. In other words, the ¢rm is ¢nancially constrained.
C. Centralized Borrowing: No Self-Financing
Under centralized borrowing, headquarters borrows against the combined cash £ow of the two projects. The relevant cash £ow is therefore r(l,l) :5 2p l with probability p 2 , r(l,h) :5 p l 1p h with probability 2p(1 À p), and r(h,h) :5 2p h with probability (1 À p) 2 . The sequence of events is the same as under decentralized borrowing.
As a contract now encompasses two projects, the potential contracting space becomes richer. In particular, the investor may use separate re¢nancing probabilities b 1ŝ s ð Þ and b 2 ðŝ sÞ for each of the two second-period investments, which implies he will end up re¢nancing either zero, one, or two projects. It can be shown, however, that any such contract is equivalent to a contract where the investor uses a common re¢nancing probability bŝ s ð Þ for both second-period investments.
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Without loss of generality, we can thus assume that the investor pays 2I with probability bŝ s ð Þ at date 1. We ¢nally need to specify what the ¢rm's self-¢nancing possibilities are if a ¢rm with two high cash £ows falsely claims that its cash £ows are low. Given Assumption 1, there are only two possibilities: (a) 2(p h À p l )oI, in which case the ¢rm cannot self-¢nance at all, and (b) 2I42(p h À p l )4I, in which case a ¢rm with two high cash £ows can make one, but only one, second-period investment without returning to the capital market. If a high cash-£ow ¢rm could self-¢nance both second-period projects, Assumption 1 would be violated, that is, the investor's threat would be empty and ¢nancing would break down.
In our model, centralization has costs and bene¢ts. We derive the basic tradeo¡ in two steps.We ¢rst consider the case where self-¢nancing is not possible. In this case, centralization has only bene¢ts.We then introduce the possibility that a high cash-£ow ¢rm can self-¢nance one second-period investment with internal cash. In this case, the bene¢ts derived earlier are still there, but there are also costs.
Consider ¢rst the case where the ¢rm cannot self-¢nance second-period investment. Formally, we have the assumption that self-¢nancing is not possible.
In what follows, we assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
2 A proof of this statement is contained in a previous working paper version of this paper (Inderst and Mˇller (2000) ). The proof is available from the authors upon request.
The problem under centralized borrowing is to provide headquarters with incentives to reveal the true cash £ow. Denote the set of possible cash £ows by S :5 {(l,l), (l,h) 
The individual rationality constraint can be again omitted as it is implied by the stronger limited liability constraints (6) and (7).
The optimal contract is derived in the Appendix in the proof of Proposition 1. In the low-and high-cash-£ow states, the optimal contract is the same as under decentralized borrowing, except that all payments are multiplied by two. We thus have b(l,l) 5 0, R 1 (l,l) 5 2p l , b(h,h) 5 1, R 1 ðh; hÞ ¼ 2p; and R 2 (h,h) 5 2p l . If both ¢rst-period cash £ows are low, the ¢rm obtains no second-period ¢nancing, while if both ¢rst-period cash £ows are high, the ¢rm obtains second-period ¢nancing for sure. In the intermediate case where one cash £ow is low and the other is high, the optimal contract is either identical to that of the high-cash-£ow ¢rm (if pZ1/2), or it has b(h,l) 5 1/[2(1 À p)]41/2, R 1 (h,l) 5 p h 1p l , and R 2 (h,l) 5 2p l (if pr1/2).This case distinction is due to the fact that if pZ1/2 the limited liability constraint (7) is slack. By contrast, if po1/2 the constraint binds, which implies that the investor can extract the maximum possible date 1 repayment.
The only cash-£ow state where centralization makes a di¡erence is thus the intermediate state where one cash £ow is low and the other is high. In this state, the re¢nancing probability is strictly greater than one-half. By contrast, the average re¢nancing probability under decentralized borrowing is [b(h)1b(l)]/2 5 1/2. We can therefore conclude that the ¢rst type of ine⁄ciency, namely, that e⁄cient second-period investments are not undertaken, is less severe if borrowing is centralized.
If we insert the optimal contract in the investor's objective function (4) and solve for the value of I at which he breaks even, we obtain that the investor invests at date 0 if and only if
if pr1/2, and
if pZ1/2. Comparing (8) to (9) with the corresponding value under decentralized borrowing, (3), we have that the second type of ine⁄ciency, namely, that positive NPV projects are not ¢nanced at date 0, is also less severe under centralized borrowing.This holds for any value of p.The following proposition summarizes these results.
PROPOSITION 1: If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, centralized borrowing is optimal for all p. That is, it is optimal to have headquarters borrow on behalf of both projects and subsequently allocate the funds on the ¢rm's internal capital market rather than have each project borrow separately on the external capital market.
The superiority of centralization vis-a' -vis decentralization is not based on a superior allocation of funds to projects inside the ¢rm. At date 1, the two projects are identical in every respect. Hence, there is no scope for winner picking. Rather, the superiority of centralization derives from the fact that incentives for revealing the true date 1 cash £ow can be provided more e⁄ciently. The argument why centralized borrowing is optimal proceeds in two steps. If both projects have a high cash £ow, the optimal repayment and re¢nancing probability under centralized and decentralized borrowing are identical. Similarly, if both projects have a low cash £ow, the optimal contracts under centralized and decentralized borrowing are the same. In what follows, we can thus focus on the intermediate cash-£ow state where one project has a high and the other has a low cash £ow. To facilitate the exposition, we ¢rst derive some preliminary results. Incentive compatibility requires that a ¢rm with two high cash £ows or one high and one low cash £ow has no incentive to mimic a ¢rm with two low cash £ows. To make mimicking a low-cash-£ow ¢rm as costly as possible, the investor sets b(l) 5 0 and R 1 (l) 5 p l (under decentralized borrowing) and b(l,l) 5 0 and R 1 (l,l) 5 2p l (under centralized borrowing). Moreover, it is evidently optimal to set R 2 (h) 5 p l and R 2 (h,l) 5 R 2 (h,h) 5 2p l , which means the ¢rm must pay out its entire veri¢able date 2 cash £ow.
Under decentralized borrowing, one ¢rm has a high and the other has a low cash £ow. Consider the high-cash-£ow ¢rm's incentive compatibility constraint:
The right-hand side depicts the payo¡ from mimicking the low-cash-£ow ¢rm. Accordingly, to induce the high-cash-£ow ¢rm to reveal its cash £ow, the investor must leave the ¢rm a rent of p h À p l if it announces h. (This rent is called information rent.) The investor can provide this rent in two ways: (a) he can demand a lower date 1 repayment R 1 (h), or (b) he can grant the ¢rm a higher continuation bene¢t bðhÞ p À p l ½ by increasing the continuation probability b(h). Consider the cost to the investor under either option. Reducing the date 1 repayment is a zerosum transaction, that is, a dollar left in the ¢rm's pocket is a dollar less in the investor's pocket. By contrast, granting the ¢rm a continuation bene¢t of
is the (expected) e⁄ciency gain from second-period investment. As the investor makes the contract o¡er, he can siphon o¡ this e⁄-ciency gain. The solution is thus to provide as much rent as possible in the form of continuation bene¢ts.
3 As the maximum continuation bene¢t under decentralized borrowing is p À p l ; the remainder p h À p must come in the form of ¢rst-period rent, that is, in the form of a lower date 1 repayment.
Consider now the intermediate-cash-£ow ¢rm under centralized borrowing. As we show in the Appendix in the proof of Proposition 1, it su⁄ces to consider the incentive constraint ensuring that the intermediate-cash-£ow ¢rm has no incentive to mimic the low-cash-£ow ¢rm:
The information rent that must be granted in the intermediate-cash-£ow state is again p h À p l . Unlike above, however, the investor can now provide a continuation bene¢t of up to 2 p À p l ½ .The continuation bene¢t actually provided is either
, which is both strictly greater than the corresponding value p À p l under decentralized borrowing.This is what constitutes the fundamental advantage of centralized over decentralized borrowing. While the total information rent is the same under centralized and decentralized borrowing, its composition is di¡erent. Under decentralized borrowing, the continuation decision concerns a single project, which means that a relatively large fraction of the rent must come in the form of ¢rst-period rent. By contrast, under centralized borrowing the continuation decision concerns two projects, which means that most (if pZ1/2), or even all (if po1/2) of the information rent can be provided in the form of continuation bene¢ts.This is e⁄cient, as it involves undertaking positive NPV investments that would have not been undertaken otherwise. Our result that centralization improves contract e⁄ciency is robust in various ways. It holds if the state space is continuous (Section II.A), if investments are divisible (Sec. II.B), if credit markets are competitive (footnote 3 and Sec. II.E), and if cash £ows are correlated (Sec. III.A).
Another way to view the trade-o¡ between ¢rst-and second-period rents is in terms of ¢nancial slack. Any nonveri¢able date 1 cash £ow retained in the ¢rm represents unused liquidity: E⁄ciency could be improved by trading it in for continuation rights. Consider the high-cash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing. After paying out p, the high-cash-£ow ¢rm has remaining liquidity of p h À p: If the high-cash-£ow ¢rm were to share this liquidity with the low-cash£ow ¢rm, the latter could trade it in for continuation rights. But as each ¢rm cares only about its own continuation decision, this does not happen. 4 Under centralized borrowing, this externality problem does not arise. As headquarters adopts a ¢rm-wide perspective, it does not care which of the two projects produces the cash £ow. E¡ectively, headquarters uses liquidity produced by the high-cash-£ow project to buy continuation rights for the low-cash-£ow project. (This also explains why the bene¢ts of centralization arise only in the intermediate-cash-£ow state.) Note that a ¢nancial intermediary, such as, for example, a bank, cannot do this as it does not have direct access to the ¢rms'cash £ow. Much like the investor under decentralized borrowing, a bank would have to provide the high-cash-£ow ¢rm with incentives to disgorge cash.
Finally, consider again the inequality in Assumption 2 and replace 2 by n, which implies that even n projects cannot provide su⁄cient cash to ¢nance a single second-period investment. Replacing 2 by n, we obtain n(p h À p l )oI. If n becomes su⁄ciently large, this inequality can no longer be satis¢ed. In other words, the more projects there are under one roof, the more likely it is that the ¢rm can ¢nance at least one second-period investment without returning to the capital market.Therefore, let us next consider the case where (partial) self-¢nan-cing is possible.
D. Centralized Borrowing: Self-Financing
In the context of this model, self-¢nancing means that if both date 1 cash £ows are high, headquarters can use its nonveri¢able cash £ow of 2(p h À p l ) and ¢nance one second-period investment without having to return to the capital market.We replace Assumption 2 by Assumption 3.
In what follows, we assume that Assumptions 1 and 3 hold.
The fact that a high-cash-£ow ¢rm can partly self-¢nance second-period investment tightens the ¢rm's incentive compatibility constraint. In the absence of self-¢nancing, the payo¡ from mimicking a low-cash-£ow ¢rm is 2(p h À p l ). By contrast, if the ¢rm can self-¢nance second-period investment, the payo¡ from mimicking a low-cash-£ow ¢rm (and subsequently reinvesting the retained cash) is 2 p h À p l ð Þþp À I: To induce the high-cash-£ow ¢rm not to mimic a low-cash-£ow ¢rm the investor must now additionally compensate the ¢rm for the forgone profit of p À I, that is, he must pay the ¢rm a higher information rent. The general idea is that, by pooling cash £ows from several projects, centralized ¢rms may accumulate internal funds and make follow-up investments without having to return to the capital market. This weakens the investors' threat to withhold future ¢nancing, which in turn tightens ¢nancing constraints at date 0.
If we solve the investor's expected pro¢t for the value of I at which he breaks even, we have that the investor invests at date 0 if and only if
if p 1=2; and (12) to (13) with the corresponding value under decentralized borrowing, (3), we obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 2: If Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, centralized borrowing where headquarters borrows on behalf of both projects is optimal if p ! ffiffi ffi 2 p À 1: By contrast, if p ffiffi ffi 2 p À 1 it is optimal to have each project borrow separately on the external capital market.
Self-¢nancing makes it more costly for the investor to induce the ¢rm to reveal its true cash £ow, which is captured by the additional ''bribe, '' or information rent, p À I in the high-cash-£ow state. The cost of centralization thus depends on the distribution of cash £ows in two ways. First, the probability of the high-cash-£ow state is decreasing in p. Second, the ''bribe'' p À I is also decreasing in p. Proposition 2 shows that if p is su⁄ciently small, that is, if the projects' productivity is su⁄ciently high, the costs of centralization outweigh the bene¢ts. To relax ¢nan-cing constraints, the ¢rm should decentralize, or what is equivalent, disintegrate. As a single-project ¢rm does not generate enough cash to self-¢nance second-period investment, it must necessarily revisit the capital market. Hence, decentralization acts as a commitment vis-a' -vis investors to stay on a tight leash.
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The notion that ¢rms may bene¢t from committing to a policy of revisiting the 5 If both ¢rst-period cash £ows are high, the two ¢rms have a strong incentive to remerge at date 1. To commit not to merge again, the ¢rms may write a covenant into their debt contract restricting merger activity. Such covenants are common. For instance, Smith and Warner (1979) ¢nd that 39.1 percent of the public debt issues in their sample include covenants restricting merger activity. capital market is not new and has been used as an explanation, for example, for why ¢rms pay dividends (Easterbrook (1984) ) or issue debt (Jensen (1986) ). In showing that a ¢rm's organizational structure may act as a commitment to revisit the capital market, our argument complements these arguments.
The investor cannot legally prevent the ¢rm from self-¢nancing as both cash £ows and investment decisions are nonveri¢able. While the assumption that investment decisions are nonveri¢able may be realistic in some cases, in particular if the ¢rm consists of a complex bundle of investments where it is di⁄cult for outsiders to ascertain whether the i-th investment has been undertaken or not, it may be less realistic in other cases. In Section II.C, we show that the assumption that investment decisions are nonveri¢able is not needed if the parties can renegotiate after default.
Proposition 2 admits an alternative interpretation, which goes beyond the issue of ¢nancing constraints. It applies to situations where managers can withhold cash from both investors and the ¢rm's owner(s). This may be because managers are better informed or ownership is dispersed, implying that the owners, while having formal control rights, have insu⁄cient incentives to enforce their claims. Under this scenario, the ¢rm's owners are in the same boat as the investor: Unless management can be incentivized to pay out cash, neither the investor nor the owners will see any of it. The optimal contract underlying Proposition 2 is also optimal in this setting as it maximizes the cash £ow extracted by outsiders. The p-threshold characterizing the ¢rm boundaries also remains optimal.
II. Discussion
A. Continuous Cash-Flow Distribution
The argument that one project does not generate enough cash to allow self-¢nan-cing but two projects do is evidently independent of the cash-£ow distribution. This is not so obvious with regard to the bene¢ts of centralization, that is, the argument that ¢nancial contracts with centralized ¢rms are more e⁄cient.
Suppose cash £ows are continuously distributed with support [p l ,p h ]. Consider ¢rst the case where borrowing is decentralized. It can be shown that the optimal contract is b(p) 5 1 and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) ). The optimal contract thus resembles a standard debt contract with face value p and liquidation probability 1 À b (p). Consider next centralized borrowing. The ¢rm's ''type'' is fully characterized by the sum o : 5 p 1 1p 2 , where p 1 and p 2 are the two ¢rst-period cash £ows. Again, it can be shown that the optimal contract is b(o) 5 1 and R 1 ðoÞ ¼ 2p if o ! 2p; and bðoÞ
Hence, the optimal contract is again a standard debt contract, now with face value 2p and liquidation probability 1 À b(o).
Consider the above optimal contracts. If either p 1 p and p 2 p or if p 1 ! p and p 2 ! p; that is, if either both cash £ows are low or high, the re¢nancing probability under centralized borrowing is identical to the average re¢nancing probability under decentralized borrowing, [b(p 1 )1b(p 2 )]/2. In all other (i.e., intermediate) cash-£ow states, the re¢nancing probability is strictly greater under centralized borrowing.The intuition for why centralized borrowing is superior is the same as in the basic model: In intermediate-cash-£ow states, headquarters can use excess liquidity from low-cash-£ow projects to buy continuation rights for high-cash-£ow projects. In high-and low-cash-£ow states, such cross-subsidies are either not necessary or not possible, respectively. By contrast, under decentralized borrowing, cross-subsidies never occur. Accordingly, the ¢rst type of ine⁄ciency, namely, that e⁄cient second-period investments are not undertaken, is strictly lower under centralized borrowing.
We can again solve for the value of I at which the investor breaks even. Again, we ¢nd that the second type of ine⁄ciency, namely, that positive NPV projects are not ¢nanced at date 0, is less severe under centralized borrowing if and only if the expected re¢nancing probability under centralized borrowing is higher. By the above argument, this is the case if and only if
that is, if there is a nonzero probability that one cash £ow is below and the other is above the mean. Proposition 1 thus extends to arbitrary continuous cash-£ow distributions satisfying (14). If (14) does not hold, the organizational structure is irrelevant. Condition (14) holds, for instance, if the joint distribution of p 1 ,p 2 has full support. Conversely, if p 1 and p 2 are perfectly positively correlated, (14) does not hold. Since both distributions have the same mean, the probability that one cash £ow is below the mean and the other is above the mean is then zero.
B. Indivisibility of Investments
What is the role of investment indivisibilities in this model? In particular, suppose at date 1 the ¢rm could invest a fraction ar1of I in a project technology with constant returns to scale.Would this a¡ect our results? We address this question in three parts, pertaining to the role of indivisibilities for (a) the threat to withhold ¢nancing (''termination threat''), (b) the bene¢ts of centralization, and (c) the costs of centralization.
B.1. TerminationThreat
Consider, for instance, the benchmark model of decentralized borrowing. There, the incentives for a high-cash-£ow ¢rm to repay p instead of p l are that in return the investor ¢nances second-period investment. Investment indivisibilities are not essential in providing these incentives.What is essential is that the ¢rm cannot capture all, or most, of the second-period e⁄ciency gains by self-¢nancing the investment. Suppose the high-cash-£ow ¢rm can use its nonveri¢able cash £ow of p h À p l to ¢nance a fraction a : 5 (p h À p l )/I of the second-period investment.With constant returns to scale, the expected return on this investment is ap: By the same logic as in Section I.D (''self-¢nancing''), the investor must then grant the high-cash-£ow ¢rm an additional information rent of a p À I ð Þto preserve incen-tive compatibility. Solving the investor's expected pro¢t for the value of I at which he breaks even, we have that the investor invests at date 0 if and only if
If a 5 0, (15) coincides with the corresponding threshold in the basic model, (3). By inspection, the right-hand side in (15) is strictly decreasing in a, positive for low a, and negative for high a. If a is high, the ¢rm can realize most of the secondperiod e⁄ciency gains without borrowing additional funds from the investor. In this case, the investor's threat to withhold ¢nancing at date 1 is ine¡ective, and ¢nancing at date 0 breaks down. By contrast, if a is low, the ¢rm can only realize a small fraction of the e⁄ciency gains by itself. In this case, the incentives to make a high repayment and turn to the investor for additional funding are strong, and date 0 ¢nancing becomes feasible. Moreover, the lower a, the greater is the righthand side in (15), and the looser is the ¢rm's date 0 ¢nancing constraint. Hence, the e¡ectiveness of the threat to withhold future ¢nancing does not depend on investment indivisibilities. What is key, however, is that the ¢rm cannot exploit all, or most, of the e⁄ciency gains through self-¢nancing.
B.2. Bene¢ts of Centralization
In Section I.C (''no self-¢nancing''), we elucidated the bene¢ts of cash-£ow pooling by comparing the incentive compatibility constraint of the high cash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing, (10), with that of the intermediate cash-£ow ¢rm under centralized borrowing, (11). Consider again these two incentive constraints, now assuming that the ¢rm can use its nonveri¢able cash £ow to invest in a project technology with constant returns to scale. The two incentive constraints become
and
respectively. The high-cash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing and the intermediate-cash-£ow ¢rm under centralized borrowing have the same nonveri¢-able cash £ow, p h À p l . Hence, both ¢rms can invest the same fraction a and, by the argument in (a), earn the same additional information rent a p À I ð Þ.The bene¢ts of cash-£ow pooling thus remain unchanged: Both ¢rms continue to earn the same total information rent (right-hand side in (16) and (17)), but under centralized borrowing, a greater fraction of this rent can be provided in the form of continuation bene¢ts.
B.3. Costs of Centralization
In Section I.C (''self-¢nancing''), the costs of centralization were that in the highcash-£ow state, the centralized ¢rm can extract a higher information rent than the two decentralized ¢rms together. These costs do not arise if the ¢rm can invest a fraction a of I in a project technology with constant returns to scale at date 1. Note that in all three cash-£ow states the centralized ¢rm and the two standalone ¢rms together have the same nonveri¢able cash £ow, namely, 2(p h À p l ) (high-cash-£ow state), p h À p l (intermediate-cash-£ow state), and zero (low-cash£ow state). By the argument in (B.2), the information rent collected by the centralized ¢rm is therefore the same as that collected by the two decentralized ¢rms together in each of the three cash-£ow states.
For centralization to be costly in our model, it is essential that in the high-cash£ow state the centralized ¢rm, after investing its nonveri¢able cash £ow of 2(p h À p l ), earns a higher second-period return than the two decentralized ¢rms together after investing p h À p l each.This is true if and only if the project technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. The ¢xed-cost technology in Section I is not the sole, but a practically very important example of this technology class.
C. Nonveri¢ability of Investment Decisions
In Section I.D, the nonveri¢ability of investment decisions allowed the ¢rm to self-¢nance second-period investment without interference by the investor provided it had enough (nonveri¢able) cash £ow. The investor cannot simply add a clause in the contract stating that the ¢rm cannot invest unless it makes a su⁄-ciently high repayment. As investment decisions are nonveri¢able, the only way for the investor to get the ¢rm to make a high repayment is to pay it a higher bribe, that is, information rent. We argued earlier that the assumption that investment decisions are nonveri¢able may be realistic in some cases, but less realistic in others. We shall now relax this assumption, instead assuming that the parties can renegotiate after default.The basic insight remains the same: Centralization is costly because the centralized ¢rm can realize a higher payo¡ in the renegotiation than two decentralized ¢rms together. Consequently, the investor must o¡er the centralized ¢rm a higher bribe to prevent default.
Our model of renegotiation is adapted from Hart and Moore (1998) . In this setting, if the ¢rm defaults, the investor seizes the asset underlying the project. To bring their story in line with our model, we assume that the asset value corresponds to the veri¢able cash-£ow component p l . The investor then has the choice between selling the asset on the market or renegotiating ownership. If the investor sells the asset on the market, he receives p l . If he sells the asset back to the ¢rm, he receives P, which is the price obtained in the renegotiation. If the asset is sold back to the ¢rm, it may be used for another period, where it generates a nonveri¢able return of p l 1D. At the end of the second period, the asset's liquidation value is zero. We shall assume that D40, that is, the asset is worth more to the ¢rm than to the market, which implies that date 1 liquidation is ine⁄cient. As Hart and Moore point out, however, the ¢rm may not have enough cash to compensate the investor for not liquidating the asset.
Consider the high-cash-£ow state, and suppose that 2(p h À p l )4p l 4(p h À p l ), where the ¢rst inequality follows from Assumption 3. In this case, neither of the two stand-alone ¢rms has su⁄cient cash to buy back the asset. However, the centralized ¢rmFafter earning 2p h but claiming that it has only 2p l Fhas the necessary cash, which means there is scope for renegotiation. Depending on the distribution of bargaining powers and the ¢rm's liquidity, the outcome of the renegotiation is that the centralized ¢rm makes an additional net gain of p l 1D À PZ0.
6 In a renegotiation-proof contract, the investor must therefore pay the centralized ¢rm a higher information rent than the two decentralized ¢rms together. Even though investment decisions are veri¢able (the use of the asset in the second period is observable) and the investor can prevent the ¢rm from continuing by liquidiating the asset, we have again that centralization lowers the investor's pro¢t in the high-cash-£ow state, which is all we need for Proposition 2 to hold.
D. Renegotiation
While the optimal contract under both centralized and decentralized borrowing entails ine⁄ciencies, there will be no renegotiation on the equilibrium path, as the maximum which the investor can assure in the second period is p l oI. As the discussion in the preceding subsection suggests, the situation is di¡erent if the high-cash-£ow ¢rm falsely claims that its cash £ow is low (i.e., o¡ the equilibrium path). Consider, for instance, the high-cash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing. Upon claiming that its cash £ow is low, the ¢rm pays out p l , which implies its remaining (i.e., nonveri¢able) cash £ow is p h À p l .While this is not enough to self¢nance second-period investment, the ¢rm could renegotiate and ask the investor for additional funds of I À (p h À p l )op l . As the investor can assure a date 2 repayment of p l , he will provide these funds. A similar reasoning holds for the high-and intermediate-cash-£ow ¢rms under centralized borrowing. In a renegotiation-proof contract, the investor would therefore have to pay all but the lowest cash-£ow ¢rms an additional information rent. Besides, however, nothing changes. In particular, as long as the investor has su⁄cient bargaining power in the renegotiation, the costs and bene¢ts of centralization are the same as in the commitment case. 
E. Competitive Credit Markets
Introducing competitive credit markets mitigates the underinvestment problem but does not eliminate it. For instance, the re¢nancing probability of the lowcash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing is then no longer zero but strictly between zero and one. The fact that b(l) 5 0 facilitated many of our results. If 6 The inequality may be strict even if the investor has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation. For instance, suppose 2(p h À p l ) 5 p l 1D/2. In this case, the investor can extract, at most, half of the surplus, since p l 1D/2 is the most that headquarters can pay.
7 If the ¢rm has all the bargaining power, the investor's payo¡ from each project is À I1p l o0. Hence, ¢nancing breaks down completely, much like when there is only a single period.
b(l)40, these results will be more complex, but their qualitative nature remains the same. In particular, both the underinvestment problem and the basic tradeo¡ analyzed here remain the same. One minor change is that the contract between the ¢rm and the investor must be augmented by a seniority provision (both under centralized and decentralized borrowing). To see this, suppose the highcash-£ow ¢rm under decentralized borrowing defaults and approaches a new investor. As the ¢rm needs only I À (p h À p l )op l to ¢nance second-period investment, the new investor is willing to help out. But this means that the original investor will make a loss. A seniority provision stating that the ¢rm cannot make a repayment to a new investor unless it has fully settled its debt with the original investor avoids this problem. Since payments to and from investors are veri¢able, such a seniority provision is enforceable.
III.Which Projects Should Be Pooled?
In this section, we examine the decision to pool projects from various angles.The empirical implications following from this are discussed in Section IV.
A. Correlation
We now relax our assumption that cash £ows in any given period are uncorrelated.We do, however, retain the assumption that cash £ows are serially uncorrelated. Denote the correlation coe⁄cient by r. While the optimal contract under both self-¢nancing and ''no self-¢nancing'' remains unchanged, allowing for correlation alters the probabilities of the three cash-£ow states and therefore the investor's expected payo¡. (Intuitively, the optimal contract remains unchanged, as incentive compatibility and limited liability are both ex post constraints that do not depend on the ex ante probabilities.) The new probabilities are p[1 À (1 À r)(1 À p)] for the low-cash-£ow state, 2(1 À r)p(1 À p) for the intermediate-cash-£ow state, and (1 À p)[1 À p(1 À r)] for the high-cash-£ow state. A derivation of these probabilities can be found in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
If self-¢nancing is not possible, the result is evident. As centralization has bene¢ts but no costs, centralized borrowing is optimal except if r 5 1. If r 5 1, the probability of the intermediate-cash-£ow state is zero. But the intermediatecash-£ow state is the only cash-£ow state where centralized and decentralized borrowing di¡er. If self-¢nancing is possible, the result is more complex.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Decentralized borrowing is optimal if rZ2/3 while centralized borrowing is optimal if rr À 1/2. If rA( À 1/2,2/3), there exists a strictly increasing function p r ð Þ such that decentralized borrowing is optimal if p p r ð Þ and centralized borrowing is optimal if p ! p r ð Þ:
If r-1, the probability of the intermediate-cash-£ow state goes to zero while the probability of the high-cash-£ow state remains positive. Hence centralization has costs but no bene¢ts. Conversely, if r-À 1 the probability of the high-cash-£ow state goes to zero while the probability of the intermediate- 
B. High versus Low Future Pro¢tability
Is conglomeration more bene¢cial in industries where expected future pro¢ts are low or high? To answer this question, we introduce separate probabilitiesFand hence pro¢tabilitiesFfor each period. Denote the probability of the low cash £ow in period t by p t and the corresponding expected cash £ow by p t .While we no longer assume that the two periods are the same, we retain the assumption that the two projects are identical. Heterogeneous project bundles are considered below. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. If p 2 r1/2 centralized borrowing is optimal if and only if p 1 Z(1 À p 2 )/(11p 2 ). By contrast, if p 2 Z1/2, centralized borrowing is optimal if and only if p 1 Z1/3.
If the ¢rst-period pro¢tability is su⁄ciently high, centralized borrowing is never optimal. For all other values of p 1 , there exists a critical p 2 -value such that decentralized borrowing is optimal if p 2 is below that value and centralized borrowing is optimal if p 2 is above that value. Intuitively, if the follow-up investment is unattractive, the incentives to engage in self-¢nancing are small, which implies that centralized ¢rms can be disciplined at a relatively low cost. In this case, the bene¢ts of centralization outweigh the costs. By contrast, if the follow-up investment is attractive, the incentives to engage in self-¢nancingFand thus the information rent that must be granted to the high-cash-£ow ¢rmFare high. In this case, the costs of centralization outweigh the bene¢ts.
C. Cash-Flow Balancing
The termination threat is based on an intertemporal exchange: The ¢rm exchanges ¢rst-period cash £ow (thereby giving up ¢rst-period rents) for secondperiod continuation rights. The termination threat is thus most e¡ective if there is a balance between ¢rst-period cash £ow and continuation rights. If the continuation value is high but the ¢rst-period cash £ow is low the ¢rm can only buy a small fraction of the continuation rights. Similarly, if the ¢rst-period cash £ow is high but the continuation value is low the ¢rm is only willing to give up a fraction of its cash £ow equal to the continuation value. (Centralization mitigates this problem by raising the continuation value.)
The above argument suggests that if projects are strongly front-(high p 1 but low p 2 ) and backloaded (low p 1 but high p 2 ), it may be better to pool one frontand one backloaded project instead of two front-or two backloaded projects. The idea is that the high cash £ow generated by the frontloaded project can be used to buy continuation rights for the (valuable) second tranche of the backloaded project. This intuition can be formalized. Suppose the probability of the low cash £ow can take two values: p H and p L , where
The expected two-period cash £ow is the same for both projects.We obtain the following result.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. If p L À p H is su⁄ciently large, implying that projects are su⁄ciently front-and backloaded, it is optimal to pool one front-and one backloaded project rather than two front-or two backloaded projects.
Proposition 5 has implications for investment policy. To maintain a balanced portfolio, ¢rms might optimally want to forgo pro¢table investments in favor of investments that are less pro¢table but have a more favorable cash-£ow pattern.
To give an extreme example of cash-£ow balancing, suppose there are two kinds of projects: (a) Frontloaded projects generating an expected cash £ow of p in the ¢rst period and zero in the second period, and (b) backloaded projects generating zero in the ¢rst period and an expected cash £ow of p in the second period. For simplicity, suppose in a period where no cash £ow is generated, the investment cost is zero. Both projects are thus e¡ectively one-period projects. From Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , we know that neither the front-nor the backloaded project aloneFnor a bundle consisting of two front-or two backloaded projectsFcan raise external ¢nance. By contrast, a bundle consisting of one front-and one backloaded project can raise external ¢nance if the investment condition (3) holds.
IV. Empirical Implications
This section summarizes the empirical implications.The ¢rst implication follows directly from the optimal contract. Consider a low-cash-£ow project (or division). If the cash £ow of the other project is also low, the re¢nancing probability is zero. By contrast, if the cash £ow of the other project is high, the re¢nancing probability is between 0.5 and 1.The argument for the high-cash-£ow project is analogous.
IMPLICATION 1: Divisional investment is positively related to the past cash £ow of other divisions. Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) provide supporting evidence. Lamont studies the reaction of U.S. oil companies to the 1986 oil price decline. He ¢nds that a lower cash £ow in the companies'core business leads to investment cuts in non-oil-related divisions. Similarly, Shin and Stulz ¢nd that the investment of smaller divisions is positively related to the cash £ow of other divisions.
In our model, the fraction of nonveri¢able cash £ow p h À p l measures the magnitude of the agency problem between the ¢rm and the investor. If all cash £ow is veri¢able, there is no value to project pooling. If some, but not too much cash £ow can be diverted, project pooling is unambiguously valuable. Finally, if enough cash £ow can be diverted to allow self-¢nancing of follow-up investments, the value of project pooling is again low.
IMPLICATION 2: Internal capital markets are most valuable if agency problems between ¢rms and investors are small (but positive), and less valuable if they are large.
The result contrasts with Stein's (1997) result that internal capital markets are most valuable if agency problems are severe.The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Consistent with Stein's argument, Hubbard and Palia (1999) ¢nd that the highest bidder returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s were earned when ¢nancially unconstrained buyers acquired constrained target ¢rms. Hubbard and Palia interpret this as evidence that capital markets viewed the formation of conglomerates in the 1960s as an e⁄cient response to the information de¢ciencies of external capital markets, which were arguably greater at that time. On the other hand, Servaes (1996) ¢nds that conglomerates in the 1960s traded at a substantial discount, which is di⁄cult to reconcile with Hubbard and Palia's interpretation. Similarly, Claessens et al. (1999) document diversi¢ca-tion patterns for corporations in the United States, Japan, and eight Asian countries, some of which do not have well-developed external capital markets. The authors do not ¢nd a clear pattern of di¡erent degrees of diversi¢cation across countries at di¡erent levels of development, concluding that ''this contrasts with the internal capital markets hypothesis ... which would suggest that ¢rms in lessdeveloped countries diversify more to reap the bene¢ts of internal markets'' (p. 8).
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Direct support for Implication 2 is provided by Lins and Servaes (2001) . Using data from Asian emerging markets countries, Lins and Servaes ¢nd that the diversi¢cation discount is greatest when management control rights substantially exceed their cash £ow rights. To the extent that the di¡erence between managerial control rights and cash-£ow rights proxies for the severity of the agency problem between management and investors, this suggests an inverse relation between the value of internal capital markets and the extent of the managerial agency problem, as suggested in this paper.
The next two implications relate a ¢rm's propensity to access external ¢nance to exogenous characteristics such as operating productivity and the degree of ¢rm diversi¢cation.
9 Khanna and Palepu (2000) ¢nd that Indian ¢rms a⁄liated with highly diversifed business groups outperform other ¢rms. The authors point out, however, that internal capital markets have nothing to do with this. Unlike, for example, Japanese keiretsu, Indian business groups have no common internal capital market.
IMPLICATION 3: Low-productivity conglomerates should have a higher, and high-productivity conglomerates should have a lower propensity to access external ¢nance than comparable stand-alone ¢rms.
IMPLICATION 4:
The propensity of conglomerates to access external ¢nance should be positively related to their degree of diversi¢cation.
Implication 3 follows from the analysis leading to Proposition 2. It follows from a comparison of the investment threshold under decentralized and centralized borrowing. Implication 4 follows from the analysis leading to Proposition 3. It does not compare stand-alone ¢rms and conglomerates, but conglomerates with di¡er-ent project correlations.
Implication 3 has, to our knowledge, not yet been tested. While Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Peyer (2001) both ¢nd that conglomerates and stand-alones have di¡erent propensities to access external ¢nance, neither paper compares low-and high-productivity (or low-and high-performance) ¢rms separately.
10 Implication 4 appears to be consistent with the empirical evidence. While Comment and Jarrell ¢nd that highly and less diversi¢ed conglomerates have similar propensities to access external capital markets, their analysis does not control for internal capital market e⁄ciency. Peyer re¢nes Comment and Jarrell's analysis by discriminating between ¢rms with e⁄cient and ine⁄cient internal capital markets. He ¢nds thatFprovided the internal capital allocation is e⁄cient (which is the case in our model)Fthe propensity of conglomerates to access external ¢nance increases with their degree of diversi¢cation.
Implications 1 to 4 are general statements that hold regardless of whether the organizational form is chosen optimally. The next two implications rest on the assumption that the organizational form is chosen optimally. Implication 5 is a direct corollary to Proposition 2, which is the central result of our paper.
IMPLICATION 5: Conglomerates should have a lower average productivity than standalone ¢rms.
Implication 5 suggests that the diversi¢cation decision is endogenous: Low-productivity ¢rms diversify while high-productivity ¢rms do not. Using plant-level data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) ¢nd thatFfor all but the smallest ¢rms in their sampleFconglomerate ¢rms in the United States are indeed less productive than single-segment ¢rms. (The smallest size category constitutes 3.3 percent of their sample.) Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1995) (for the United States) and Lins and Servaes (2001) (for emerging markets countries) ¢nd that diversi¢ed ¢rms have a smaller operating pro¢tability than stand-alone ¢rms, and Lang and Stulz (1994) ¢nd that diversifying ¢rms are poor performers relative to ¢rms that do not diversify. Finally, Campa and Kedia (1999) and Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) ¢nd that diversifying ¢rms already traded at a discount prior to the diversi¢cation, and that targets in diversifying acquisitions had already been discounted before they were acquired, respectively. Contrary evidence is provided by Schoar (2002) , who ¢nds that plants of diversi¢ed ¢rms are more productive than plants of single-segment ¢rms.
The next statement follows from Proposition 4. It rests on the notion that the incentives to engage in self-¢nancing, and hence the costs of centralization, are lower if the follow-up investment is relatively unattractive.
IMPLICATION 6: Compared to stand-alone ¢rms, conglomerates should be more prevalent in slow-growing or declining industries.
Few studies have examined the relation between conglomeration and industry growth. Consistent with our hypothesis, Lang and Stulz (1994) ¢nd that diversi¢ed ¢rms tend to be concentrated in industries with fewer growth opportunities. Similarly, Burch, Nanda, and Narayanan (2000) report a negative correlation between industry conglomeration and investment opportunities as measured by industry market-to-book ratios.
The last implication follows from Proposition 5. It compares di¡erent investment policies for conglomerates.
IMPLICATION 7: Conglomerates operating both in growing and mature/declining industries should have a higher propensity to access external ¢nance than conglomerates operating only in growing or only in mature/declining industries.
While based on a di¡erent logic than models of internal cash-£ow recycling, the implications for investment policy are similar: Firms should hold a balanced portfolio of projects generating immediate cash (''cash cows'') and projects generating cash in the future (''growth projects'').We are not aware of empirical work examining the relation between ¢nancing constraints and the composition of a ¢rm's investment portfolio.
V. Concluding Remarks
Financial contracting models typically consider an entrepreneur who raises funds for a single project. In this setting, questions regarding organizational structure or the role of internal capital markets cannot be addressed. On the other hand, internal capital markets models, while analyzing the choice between centralization and decentralization, do not consider optimal contracts between headquarters and outside investors.This paper links both literatures, thereby tying together internal and external capital markets.
We derive the optimal contract for both centralized ¢rms where headquarters borrows on behalf of multiple projects and decentralized, or stand-alone, ¢rms where individual project managers borrow separately on the external capital market. Centralization has bene¢ts and costs. On the bene¢t side, headquarters uses excess liquidity from high-cash-£ow projects to buy continuation rights for low-cash-£ow projects. This, in turn, allows headquarters to make greater repayments, which relaxes ¢nancing constraints ex ante. On the cost side, headquartersFby pooling cash £ows from several projectsFmight pursue follow-up investments without returning to the capital market.This makes it more di⁄cult for investors to discipline the ¢rm, which tightens ¢nancing constraints. We believe our model yields insights which are applicable to other areas of economics and ¢nance. By showing that cash-£ow pooling can strengthen a ¢rm's ability to expropriate investors, the paper is one of few papers emphasizing the potential costs of cash-£ow pooling.
11 Other models, especially in the ¢nancial intermediation literature, rest largely on the bene¢ts of cash-£ow pooling (e.g., Diamond (1984) ). Introducing costs in these models might yield additional insights. Second, internal capital marketsFvia their e¡ect on ¢nan-cing constraintsFmight a¡ect the strategic behavior of ¢rms in the product market. For instance, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , the presence of ¢nancing constraints creates incentives for deep-pocket ¢rms to lower the pro¢ts of ¢nan-cially constrained rivals. In this paper, we show that grouping several ¢nancially constrained ¢rms together can reduce ¢nancing constraints, and therefore the incentives of competitors to prey. Third, internal capital markets might play an important role for the credit channel and monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, to the extent that they alleviate credit constraints, internal capital markets can damp the e¡ect of shocks on business lending and hence stabilize production and economic growth.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It remains to derive the optimal contract under centralized borrowing given Assumptions 1 and 2. The rest follows from the argument in the text.
Instead of solving the problem (4) to (7), we solve a relaxed problem where the global incentive compatibility constraint (5) is replaced with the downward constraints that neither type (h,h) nor type (h,l) has an incentive to mimic type (l,l). We subsequently show that the solution to this relaxed problem also solves the original problem. In the relaxed problem, the investor solves (4) subject to the limited liability constraints (6) and (7) and the downwards incentive compatibility constraints
11 Another paper pointing out that cash-£ow pooling may entail costs is Axelson (1999) , who analyzes the costs and bene¢ts of pooling assets in a common value auction. If the number of bidders is large relative to the number of assets, pooling is costly, as it decreases bidding competition in the upper tail of the signal distribution, and, hence, seller revenues.
12 For a discussion of the macroeconomic implications of credit constraints see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000) .
where sA{(h,h), (h,l )}. Denote these constraints by C(h,h) and C(h,l ), respectively. The following two lemmas considerably simplify the analysis.
LEMMA A1: At any optimum, it must hold that b(l,l ) 5 0 and R 1 (l,l ) 5 2p l .
Proof of Lemma A1: We argue to a contradiction. Suppose b(l,l )40 and de¢ne R R 1 ðl; l Þ :¼ 2p l and R R 2 ðl; l Þ :¼ R 2 ðl; l Þ À 2p l þ R 1 ðl; lÞ. If b(l,l )o1 replacing R 1 (l,l ) and R 2 (l,l) with R R 1 ðl; l Þ and R R 2 ðl; l Þ strictly increases the investor's expected profit, whereas if b(l,l) 5 1 replacing R 1 (l,l ) and R 2 (l,l ) with R R 1 ðl; l Þ and R R 2 ðl; l Þ leaves the investor's expected pro¢t unchanged. Moreover, if C(h,h), C(h,l ), and the two limited liability constraints are satis¢ed under R 1 (l,l ) and R 2 (l,l ), they are also satis¢ed under R R 1 ðl; lÞ and R R 2 ðl; lÞ: From the second-period limited liability constraint for type (l,l ), it follows that R R 2 ðl; l Þ À 2Io0. On the other hand, since p p À I40 and R R 2 ðl; l Þ 2p l , it must be true that 2 p p À R R 2 ðl; l Þ40. Accordingly, reducing b(l,l ) strictly improves the investor's expected pro¢t without violating any of the incentive compatibility constraints, which contradicts the optimality of b(l,l )40. Given that b(l,l ) 5 0 is optimal, the fact that R 1 (l,l) 5 0 is also optimal is obvious. Q.E.D.
LEMMA A2: At any optimum, the constraints C(h,l) and C(h,h) must bind.
Proof of Lemma A2: We argue again to a contradiction. Suppose C(h,h) is slack. If b(h,h) 5 0 then C(h,h) implies that the ¢rst-period limited liability constraint for type (h,h) is also slack. But this implies that the investor can improve his expected pro¢t by raising R 1 (h,h) without violating any constraint, contradiction. If b(h,h)A(0,1), the unique optimal payments for type (h,h) are R 1 (h,h) 5 p l 1p h and R 2 (h,h) 5 2p l . Since we showed above that R 1 (l,l ) 5 2p l and b(l,l ) 5 0, this violates C(h,h), contradiction. Finally, if b(h,h) 5 1, any optimal contract must satisfy
Next, suppose C(h,l ) is slack. If b(h,l ) 5 0, the argument is the same as above. If b(h,l )A(0,1), the unique optimal payments for type (h,l) are R 1 (h,l ) 5 p h 1p l and R 2 (h,l ) 5 2p l . Observe that if 2bðh; l Þð p p À p l Þ ! p h À p l , this contract is indeed incentive compatible. Since 2(p l À I )o0, however, the investor is strictly better o¡ by reducing b(h,l ), contradiction. Finally, if b(h,l ) 5 1, any optimal contract must satisfy R 1 (h,l )1R 2 (h,l) 5 p h 1p l 12p l . In particular, this implies that any optimal contract yields the same pro¢t to the investor as a contract where R 1 (h,l ) 5 p h 1p l and R 2 (h,l ) 5 2p l . As we showed above, however, the investor would then want to decrease b(h,l ), contradiction. Q.E.D.
The ¢rst of the above lemmas implies that the lowest type (l,l ) receives no rent in equilibrium. The second lemma is a standard feature of contracting problems of this sort. Equipped with these two lemmas, we can now derive the optimal contract. LEMMA A3: The following contract is optimal:
Proof of Lemma A3: Setting b(l,l) 5 0 and R 1 (l,l) 5 2p l and inserting the binding C(h,l) and C(h,h) constraints in (4) we can rewrite the objective function as
By inspection, (A2) is strictly increasing in both b(h,l) and b(h,h), implying that the solution is b(h,l) 5 b(h,h) 5 1, if feasible. If 2 p p p h þ p l , setting b(h,l) 5 b(h,h) 5 1 is indeed feasible. The optimal payments R 1 (h,l), R 2 (h,l), R 1 (h,h), and R 2 (h,h) then follow from C(h,l), C(h,h), and the respective limited liability constraints.
If 2 p p4p h þ p l , setting b(h,l ) 5 1 violates either C(h,l) or the second-period limited liability constraint for type (h,l ). Accordingly, we must have b(h,l )o1. Next, observe that 2p4R 2 ðh; lÞ: To see this, suppose to the contrary that 2p R 2 ðh; l Þ. Subtracting the binding C(h,l) constraint from the second-period limited liability constraint for type (h,l) gives 
where the second equality follows from the de¢nition of p: It remains to show that the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the original problem (4) to (7). Since C(h,l) and C(h,h) are both binding, all other incentive compatibility constraints must bind as well, which implies that the solution is globally incentive compatible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: It remains to derive the optimal contract under centralized borrowing given Assumptions 1 and 3. The rest follows from the argument in the text.
LEMMA A4: The following contract is optimal:
(1) Type (l,l ):b(l,l ) 5 0 and R 1 (l,l ) 5 2p l . (2) Type (h,l ): b(h,l ) 5 1/[2(1 À p)], R 1 (h,l ) 5 p h 1p l , and R 2 (h,l ) 5 2p l if pr1/2, and b(h,l ) 5 1, R 1 ðh; l Þ ¼ 2p; and R 2 (h,l ) 5 2p l if pZ1/2. (3) Type (h,h): b(h,h) 5 1, R 1 (h,h) 5 2p h , and R 2 ðh; hÞ ¼ p À 2ðp h À p l Þ þ I:
Proof of Lemma A4: As in the proof of Proposition 1, we solve again a relaxed problem. The corresponding incentive compatibility constraint for type (h,h), which explicitly takes into account the possibility that type (h,h) can ¢nance one or more second-period projects with internal funds by mimicking type (l,l) 
Since R 1 (l,l)r2p l , the case where 2p h À R 1 (l,l)oI can be safely ignored as it violates Assumption 3. Moreover, Lemmas A1 to A2 in the proof of Proposition 1 continue to hold (with C(h,h) being replaced by C Cðh; hÞ). Since b(l,l) 5 0 and R 1 (l,l) 5 2p l , Assumption 3 implies that U D ðh; hÞ ¼ 2ðp h À p l Þ þ p p À I. Similar to the proof of Lemma A1, the investor's objective function can then be rewritten as À2ðp l À IÞ þ 2pð1 À pÞbðh; lÞ2ð p p À IÞ þ ð1 À pÞ 2 ð2bðh; hÞ À 1Þð p p À IÞ:
Given that (A6) is strictly increasing in both b(h,l) and b(h,h), the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 extend to the current proof. In particular, the optimal contracts for types (l,l) and (h,l) are the same as in Proposition 1. Furthermore, we have that b(h,h) 5 1, which, together with C Cðh; hÞ; implies that R 1 (h,h) 5 2p h and R 2 ðh; hÞ ¼ p p þ I À 2ðp h À p l Þ. To verify that the neglected incentive compatibility constraints hold, note that it is impossible for type (h,l) to make a repayment of R 1 (h,h) 5 2p h at date 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We ¢rst derive the joint probabilities for types (l,l), (h,l) , and (h,h) for arbitrary correlation coe⁄cients. Denote the random variables associated with the two project cash £ows by X and Y, respectively.The joint probabilities are o: 5 Pr(x 5 p l , y 5 p h ) 5 Pr(x 5 p h , y 5 p l ), Pr(x 5 y 5 p l ) 5 p À o, and Pr(x 5 y 5 p h ) 5 1 À p À o. Since r: 5 Cov(X,Y)/s X s Y and s X 5 s Y we have r 5 1 À o/p(1 À p). Solving for o we obtain the probabilities given in the text. Moreover, since ormin[p,1 À p], it follows that the correlation coe⁄cient is bounded from below by r :¼ 1 À ðmin½p; 1 À pÞ=½pð1 À pÞ. (This function characterizes the set of feasible (r,p)-combinations.) While the optimal contract under centralized borrowing is the same as that derived in the proof of Proposition 2, the investor's expected pro¢t has changed as the probabilities for types (l,l), (h,l) , and (h,h) have changed. Inserting the terms of the optimal contract in the investor's objective function while taking if two front-loaded projects are pooled, and
if two backloaded projects projects are pooled. As p H À p L -1, the spread p L À p H ¼ ðp h À p l Þ p H À p L ð Þwidens, and both (A10) and (A11) converge to p l . Consider next the investment threshold if one front-and one backloaded project are pooled.We ¢rst characterize the optimal contract, where we can build on arguments in the proof of Proposition 2. The contract with type (l,l) is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 2. Regarding type (h,l), we can treat the state where the frontloaded project has a high cash £ow and the backloaded project has a low cash £ow equivalently to the state where the backloaded project has a high cash £ow and the frontloaded project has a low cash £ow. Under the optimal contract, the investor pays I with probability one at date 1, which ensures that the ¢rm can continue the pro¢table backloaded project. The optimal repayment is p L at date 1 and p l at date 2. As for type (h,h), the investor pays again I with probability one at date 1. Due to the additional self-¢nancing constraint, however, the investor can extract at most 2p l at date 1 and zero at date 2. Substituting these speci¢cations into the investor's pro¢t function yields the investment threshold
which converges to p l 1(p h À p l )/34p l as p H À p L -1. Q.E.D.
